Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Schadenfreude, Forbidden Waffling Edition

I've been watching the Ophelia Benson Shitshow with some interest because this level of... vigorous disagreement... is unusual for the FtB crowd. And now it looks like PZ haz a sad too which, given the timing, is almost certainly a reaction to it as well.

Before I get to the substantive bit of this post I'd like to point out that they made their bed and now they have to sleep in it. It's fairly rich for Ophelia to be arguing "nuance" given her history with #upfordebate. And PZ... well, someone should tweak this cartoon to cover the current kerfuffle.

Spleen vented, moving on. Two observations regarding this contratemps:

  • Universal principles are universal.
  • Replacing one form of epistemic privilege with another doesn't actually fix anything.

Regarding the first point: The FtB crowd seems to forget from time to time that when you make sweeping declarations of principle they apply to everyone, "good guys" and "bad guys" alike (see, for example, my exchange with Deacon Duncan). If we say that the relatively-privileged need to listen to, and seek to understand, the lived experience of marginalized others instead of offering uninformed opinions then, absent qualification, this principle holds true regardless of the identifies of the parties in question. White, cis-and-heterosexual men are privileged relative to women of all stripes; the former need to be willing to be educated by the latter. Similarly, since white, cis women are privileged relative to trans* people (under any reasonable definition of "privilege", at least), they too would do well to recognize the limits of their perspective rather than making flip comparisons to Rachel Dolezal.

Needless to say, I have serious reservations about the reasoning outlined above, which brings me to the second point: There's a difference between listening to marginalized others and reflexively deferring to their opinions. Letting relative privilege become an epistemic trump simply recreates the original pathology ("truth" defined by social hierarchy) with a slightly different dramatis personae. It's rarely as straightforward as "sit down and shut up, white man" (though that does appear to be the essence of some of the recent critiques of Jonathan Chait), but epistemic deference of the type I've described seems to underlie the phenomena of "closed questions"/"JAQing off".

Here, for example, Ophelia maintains that certain questions have already been answered and that they should be treated "as closed for practical purposes". So what to do when someone responds to Ophelia's call for nuance by asserting that the question "Are trans women, women?" is closed and the answer is "yes"? Not to pick on Ophelia in particular, but she ducked into the punch on that one. Similar things can be be said with respect to JAQing off; read the comment threads associated with this whole ordeal and you'll find a number of people accusing Ophelia of "JAQing off" and "philosophical wankery".

Ultimately what I'm trying to highlight is that there is a collection of epistemic practices which has the effect of removing topics from the realm of rational discourse altogether. Which would be fine if everyone agreed on what those topics are, but the evidence outlined above strongly suggests to me that reasonable people can disagree about the effects of priviledge or when a question should be considered "closed".

Honestly, this makes me want to grab certain parties who complain about fragmentation of the atheist community and ask them what the fuck they expected? They are certainly smart enough to foresee exactly what has come to pass, that legitimating modes of discourse anchored in the subjective interpretations of individual listeners will necessarily create irreconcilable differences.

In short, I told you so.

Tuesday, June 30, 2015

Solved: 'mount failed - no mountable file systems' When Trying To Mount ISOs under OS X


Nevermind what I wrote below; the diagnosis is right, but the solution is wrong. A much simpler approach, which I finally found mentioned here, is to simply install 7Zip. Files from the ISO can then be extracted via: 7z x -o<destination dir> -y <ISO file>

Recorded for posterity because it took me way too long to figure this out and I generally know what I'm doing. Thanks to Rod Smith, who's comment here put me on the right track.

The Problem

You're trying to mount an ISO image under OS X and you're getting the error 'mount failed - no mountable file systems'.


  • The ISO image is probably a Linux installation CD/DVD. In researching this question it seems to turn up most frequently in connection with recent Ubuntu releases, but it also affects RedHat-derived systems.
  • Linux virtual machines running on the Mac via a hypervisor can mount the ISO no problem.

What's Going On?

Sometime in the not-too-distant past a bunch of Linux distros started putting out installation ISOs that are designed to work both when written to a CD and dd'd to a USB key. This is accomplished via the creation of a partitioned ISO9660 image (usually via genisoimage it seems) that tends to make OS X sad. Looking at a sample image:

$ hdiutil imageinfo OL7.iso
   partition-name: Master Boot Record
   partition-start: 0
   partition-synthesized: true
   partition-length: 1
   partition-hint: MBR
   boot-code: 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
   partition-name: OL-7.1 x86_64
   partition-start: 1
   partition-synthesized: true
   partition-length: 146919
   partition-hint: Apple_ISO
   partition-start: 146920
   partition-number: 2
   partition-length: 12616
   partition-hint: Type EF
   partition-name: OL-7.1 x86_64
   partition-start: 159536
   partition-synthesized: true
   partition-length: 538512
   partition-hint: Apple_ISO

A Solution

After some trial and error I determined that you can extract an ISO that mounts under OS X by snagging the first two partitions, which encompass the MBR and actual CD image. In the case of the example image above these partitions start at offset 0 and continue for (1+146919)=146920 512-byte blocks:

$ hdiutil mount OL7.iso
hdiutil: mount failed - no mountable file systems
$ dd if=OL7.iso of=test.iso count=146920 bs=512
146920+0 records in
146920+0 records out
75223040 bytes transferred in 0.308544 secs (243800104 bytes/sec)
$ hdiutil mount test.iso
/dev/disk2                                         /Volumes/OL-7.1 x86_64
$ ls /Volumes/OL-7.1\ x86_64/
EFI        LiveOS        images        isolinux

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

A(nother) Response To Greta Christina

Quoth Greta Christina:

There are the ones who care about social justice; the ones who want to make organized atheism more welcoming to a wider variety of people; the ones who want their atheist communities to do a better job replacing the very real services that many marginalized people get from their religions; the ones who want their atheist communities to work in alliance and solidarity with other social change movements. (Or, to be more accurate — the ones who care enough to take real action.)

And there are the ones who don’t care, who aren’t interested in connecting their atheism to social justice — or don’t care enough to take significant action. They’re the ones who would be perfectly happy to have more women or black people or other marginalized folks at their events, but don’t care about it enough to examine why their events aren’t diverse, to listen to criticism about it, to accept some responsibility for it, or to change what they do. In some cases, they’re the ones who don’t want to connect their atheist activism with social justice — and don’t want anyone else to do it, either, to the point where they’re actively working to poison any efforts in that direction.

However, she has also said:

Now, I’m going to be very clear about this: We don’t all have to agree about how exactly social justice should be reached, or what our priorities and goals should be in reaching it, or even what the concept means. We don’t have to march in political lockstep. One of the best things about atheism/ freethought/ etc. is that we value lively dissent, and that we don’t have any dogma we’re all expected to agree on.

So someone explain to me how it makes sense to devote the Atheist community to "social justice" when we shouldn't even be expected to agree on what that means? I mean, hell, John Rawls and G.A. Cohen are both concerned with "social justice", but you get radically different results depending on which one you pick. Or consider the issues that Amartya Sen (generally considered to be a warm and cuddly progressive AFAIK) raises in his essay Equality of What?.

I encourage Greta Christina to consider that some fraction of the Atheist community aren't assholes, they just don't consider "social justice" to be a sufficiently well-defined concept to be able to commit to it. As an alternative, perhaps she could state some specific propositions with which people can explicitly (dis)agree?

Also, vaguely annoyed that registration is required to comment on her blog.

Saturday, January 31, 2015

A response to Belle Waring on Jonathan Chait

TL;DR: Jonathan Chait may be a wanker, but the problem he's writing about is real.

Two points regarding Belle Waring's analyses (1, 2) of Jonathan Chait's recent article:

  1. The concerns that he voices are not solely restricted to white males who write for Slate.
  2. The core issue is a real phenomena and is not confined to academia or the comment sections of select blogs.

Getting the first point out of the way quickly, because it's mostly a distraction: Here is Maryam Namazie writing about the same thing. She is neither male, nor white, nor, as far as I have been able to determine, has she ever written for Slate (or other Slate-like publications). Given what I know of her background from reading her work its also hard to conclude that she's hangwringing/concern trolling/arguing in bad faith. So, to the extent that people have been dismissing Chait's argument solely on the basis of his personal history, publisher, or demographic characteristics, that dismissal seems questionable.

On to the second point, which is the important one: You can draw a continuous line through the MacKinnon incident, the one involving Miller-Young, and another one that just happened in my little corner of the Pacific Northwest involving someone's work at a refugee center. In each case you have one party engaging in protected (in the First Amendment sense) speech and another party claiming offense and asserting various prerogatives on the basis of that offense.

Stipulating some preliminaries to prevent the conversation from getting derailed:

  • Everyone has a right to speak.
  • No one is entitled to an audience or a platform.
  • No one is immune from criticism or the consequences of their speech.

That said, the problem lies in the third bullet, specifically determining what constitutes appropriate consequences for any particular speech act. There is no widely-agreed-upon rubric for what constitutes "offensive" speech, even among the eminently-reasonable denizens of the Crooked Timber comments section, much less community consensus regarding appropriate prerogatives for those who are legitimately offended. That this particular issue dates back to at least 1992 (and probably earlier) lends credence to Chait's underlying hypothesis; 23 years on and we're still rehashing the same discussion, with no evident progress having been made in the interim.

This fact suggests to me that the issue of arbitrating claims of offense may be fundamentally unsolvable, even among people who are otherwise genuinely inclined to get along. What this also tells me is that Chait is right; some number of people are deploying claims of offense tactically as a means of preempting discussion. What's cannot be determined, however, is the extent to which this happens, since people can't agree on the basics of what constitutes a legitimately offensive statement.

Let me end with a note on Ms. Waring: She's smart, and she certainly understands theoretical limitations. So either she's being disingenuous in her dismissal of Chait or she has a theoretic framework which solves the problem. If it's the former, shame on her for taking pot-shots at the (regrettably pot-shot-able) Chait, and if it's the latter, I'd welcome the opportunity to educate myself.


In the comments section of her first post Belle wonders "what are the actual bad effects here?":

FFS: what happens when you are impolite? People criticize you and don’t invite you back for dinner. They don’t beat you to death with an axe handle and bury you by the sump pump. Dudes like this whining about PC want something very particular indeed: not just the right to say things others find offensive but the right to say offensive things and then not be criticized for saying them. No. Political discourse is open and free, you may say what you wish, we will mock as we choose, may the best woman win. Really, what are the actual bad effects here? White men worried about people being silenced just because they’re white men–I can’t even with this shit.

Well, in the case of the Seattle incident, we have someone who seems to be doing meritorious work on the part of an under-served minority, and who may be a member of a historically oppressed minority herself, being told to sit down, shut up, and never speak again, possibly because she got caught up in a local power struggle. One plausible outcome is that she'll be less willing to help the community in the future because of the associated hassle, which would almost certainly be a loss. All this because, when the subject is "offense", we lack the analytic apparatus to tell people to GTFO.

Wednesday, November 12, 2014

PZ Myers Sure Acts Like He Believes In Free Will

PZ Myers has come out, perhaps not for the first time, against the existence of free will. Fair enough and, for the record, I agree with him. But...

He sure acts like he believes in free will. He gets angry at TERFs and fedora'd dudebros and creationists and so on, but in a world without free will that's like getting mad at the tide coming in; it's just not rational. Moral outrage only makes sense in a world where dudebros can choose to be something other that dudebros ("ought implies can" and all that); if free will doesn't exist then they literally cannot act any other way.

I don't have my copy of The Blank Slate at hand, but I think it was Steven Pinker who observed that, absent free will, moral statements really just reflect an aesthetic judgement. We're justified in uttering them on the grounds that the can beneficially alter the behavior of people who hear them but, at the same time, such statements cannot be meaningfully imbued with any sort of moral censure (or approbation) in the traditional sense.

I suppose that PZ could respond that his apparent anger is an elaborate form of kabuki that he puts on for the good of society. But a much simpler answer is that he hasn't internalized just how far down the rabbit hole goes once you take free will out of the picture. Take, for example, this snippet from "Atheism and the real search for meaning":

... [O]nce you’ve thrown off your shackles you’re now obligated to do something worthwhile with your life, because now all of our lives shine as something greater and more valuable and more important. That with freedom comes responsibility.

How can you be "obligated" to do anything when you have no free will? What sort of "freedom" is he even talking about? Argh...


Anyway... yeah. I just don't think he gets it.

Sunday, June 08, 2014

On My Frustrations With 2.5 Atheist Philosophers

Those who read this blog on a regular basis will know that I think atheism poses tremendous challenges when it comes to the formulation of a system of morality. As a consequence I've recently turned my attention to philosophers who claim to have developed "objective" (for various definitions thereof) moralities compatible with secular epistemology. Having just finished reading Natural Goodness I find myself once again frustrated by what seems to me to be a failure to grapple with fundamental, and blindingly obvious, problems.

To review, to date I've looked at Daniel Fincke, Philippa Foot, and Richard Carrier, and haven't been particularly satisfied by any of the answers they have to offer. Part of this, I'm starting to recognize, is that we're using similar language but are interested in distinctly different problems.

In particular, I believe that the primary moral challenge for contemporary secular thinkers is to figure out how to arbitrate conflicts between parties asserting P and parties asserting !P when the proposition P isn't testable/verifiable, even in theory. Lest this be taken as an abstract concern consider the following propositions:

  • The good of the individual is more important than the good of the group.
  • The good of the individual is not more important than the good of the group.

We needn't get bogged down in arguing one side or the other to understand the enormous impact to subsequent decision-making of whichever proposition is endorsed. And don't tell me that we can split the difference and try to "balance" between the two; you can, but that sort of utilitarian calculus has all sorts of problems and still requires the selection of axioms. Any way you slice it you're left with conflict which appears to be completely irreconcilable using any of the tools available in a secular toolkit. It is thus necessary to go one level "meta" and try to develop a framework where both propositions can exist to the greatest degree possible.

Now, one response to the above is to claim that I'm mistaken and that the P/!P conflict can be arbitrated empirically. This is the tack that Carrier (whom I count at the ".5" philosopher since his work isn't nearly as developed as the other two) and Foot take, both of whom start with the proposition that what is "good for"/"rational"/"in the best interests of" a person provides this empirically-based metric.

Which is great, as far as it goes, but the unavoidable reality is that interests will conflict, so there has to be some way to deal with them. This isn't even the meta conflict that I outline above, but the plain old conflict of two people wanting X in a world of limited resources.

Carrier, by his own admission, can't even do that, which blows a hole in his syllogism, since step 4 implies bounds which will necessarily be socially arbitrated. Why bother throwing a theory out there with a big, gaping hole like that? That's when I got the first inkling that Carrier (and possibly others) isn't trying to solve the problems of social morality. Carrier seems more interested in demonstrating that an atheist can pursue an end, that there is an objective "good" for any particular individual. Foot does better as a whole but seems to share his interests in individual virtue, complaining at one point that focusing on "volitional faults that impinge particularly on others" makes moral philosophy "prissy" and "moralistic".

I will confess that the question of individual virtue interests me not at all. I cannot come up with a single reason why I should care, or have cause to judge, or claim to dictate what someone does in isolation. Contra Foot, concern with what others are doing off by themselves seems to me to be the very definition of "prissy" and "moralistic".

Foot, at least, attempts to grapple with social morality, but her efforts to give an empiric grounding to efforts to arbitrate disputes ultimately fails a test which she herself raises in the book. She is able to demonstrate that certain behaviors are necessary for self-perpetuation on an individual level, and also that certain group-level norms are of net benefit to the individual as well. However, she never effectively rebuts the assertion that "the best policy will be to be unjust and not be found out".

Again, this is not a small defect but rather the key problem which must be addressed. Most people are good most of the time; society wouldn't have persisted this long if they weren't. It does us very little good to be able to say "it's wrong to kill" as a statement of aggregate behavior when we can't say the same thing at an individual level.

Which brings us to Daniel Fincke. I would like to take a moment to reiterate how glad I am that he's out there writing, since he's one of the few currently active atheists I've been able to identify who seems to grasp the challenges implicit in throwing out Divine Command Theory. It's clear from his writing that he's thought long and hard about atheist morality which, paradoxically, makes some of the things that he says all the more frustrating.

Daniel, to his credit, confronts problems such as "Why is murder bad?" head-on. I don't find his answer particularly persuasive; among other critiques, "empowerment" simply isn't well-defined enough for him to be able to make statements about murder being bad in a majority of cases, much less categorically. And even if it is, it still suffers from various structural problems associated with the use of "maximize X" as a guiding principle.

However, I'm not here to rehash my disagreements regarding Empowerment Ethics. Where I find my greatest frustration with Fincke is in our shared rejection of human-independent ends. He claims that there are no ends independent of human reason while simultaneously maintaining that "[t]eleology should not be at all out of bounds for atheists", at which point I throw up my hands and say "You keep using that word... I do not think it means what you think it means".

Cutting to the chase: If there are no ends independent of human reason then, rather than maximizing empowerment, I can suggest that we maximize pleasure, or the benefit to those least well off, or any one of a number of other metrics that have been suggested since philosphers took up the question. Each suggestion has the exact same epistemic grounding as all of the others, namely that some human pulled it out of the ether, so there's no obvious way to select one over the other.

Daniel answers this charge, in part, by noting that there's a lot of intersubjective agreement over goals. This is true, but there's a lot of reasonable and substantive disagreement over goals as well. And, even if there's agreement about goals, Fincke omits to mention that there needs to be intersubjective agreement over means as well. He and I can both be interested in reducing human suffering, but if my preferred solution is nuclear annihilation he's well within his rights to object to my methods.

None of this should be news to Daniel; the notion of "reasonable disagreement" goes back to Rawls at least. Good-willed truth-seekers can have irreconcilable differences with broad ramifications. I honestly think that a lot of the "schisms" in the skeptical community have more to do with fundamental differences of this nature than with people just being assholes. So more than anything else I guess is seems odd to me that Fincke invests so much time and effort in his Empowerment Ethics when there are more fundamental problems which remain unresolved.

I'm going to end this by getting up on my soapbox and saying the same damn thing I've said before: All atheists are ultimately deontologists whether they recognize it or not, because they acknowledge that humans make the rules. The problem of reasonable disagreement is why I'm a libertarian, and why I think it's best to build a moral system using a small number of broad axioms which can be stated up front.

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Notes on "Natural Goodness"

My notes on Natural Goodness by Philippa Foot, which I'm taking up on the recommendation of Richard Carrier. I expect that I'll probably do something with these shortly.

Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called an 'Aristotelian necessity': that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangson it. We invoke the same idea when we say that it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill.... And it will surely not be denied denied that there is something wrong with a freeriding wolf that feeds but does not take part in the hunt, as with a member of the species of dancing bees who finds a source of nectar but whose behavior does not let other bees know if its location. These free-riding individuals of a species whose members work together are just as defective as those who have defective hearing, sight, or powers of locomotion (Pp. 15 - 16).

The free-riding wolf is certainly behaving contrary to type, and contrary to the interests of its pack, but it doesn't follow from there that wolf is necessarily "defective". Lack of hearing, or sight, or locomotion affects the individual organism, but free-riding can conceivably benefit the organism.

I'm withholding judgement for the moment, but I suspect that this is going to turn into a problem later on. What is good (in the sense of promoting wellbing) for a single organism might not be good for the group as a whole; unless we equate the good of a single organism with the good of the group there will probably be tension between the two.

We start from the fact that there is a basis for the Aristotelian categorial that does not come from the counting of heads.... What is crucial to all teleological is the expectation of an answer to the question 'What part does it play in the life cycle of things of species S?'

This would seem to imply that mere deviance from the norm is insufficient to classify something as "bad" or "defective". Going back to the example of the free-loading wolf, this would indicate that the "free-loading" is not bad simply because most wolves do not free-load, but must be bad on account of some deleterious effect it has on the organism.

The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction: in most species involving defence, and in some the rearing of the young. (p. 33)

An important consideration is tucked away in the accompanying footnote:

In most cases we speak of what each member of the species needs to be and to do in order that it should flourish. But of course what is needed may be needed in a group, like cooperation in a pack, or obedience to a leader, and what a member of the species is or does may advantage others rather than himself. (Footnote 13, p. 33).

Let's consider the free-loading wolf again in light of the previous two statements. It would seem that free-loading is defective to the extent that it hinders what is needed for "development, self-maintenance, and reproduction". Now here's a question for consideration: Does free-loading always provide a hinderance to "the good", or are there situations where it may actually redound to the organism's benefit?

This is a question of fact which is best answered by someone who studies wolves, but let me proffer a plausible (though possibly incorrect) scenario: If a wolf free-loads all of the time the other wolves will eventually learn/recognize this, and cease to share in the kill. However, a wolf who free-loads judiciously (something significantly less than all of the time) may continue to receive a share of the kill while avoiding expending the associated effort. It thus is not outside the bound of reason that free-loading might promote the well-being of the wolf in certain circumstances.

So, far from being obviously defective, as claimed previously, the free-loading wolf might have a slight edge on its non-freeloading cousins. If we continue to identify "the good" with what benefits an individual organism then by that metric the free-loading wolf is "better" that its cooperative peers. This is in no way contradicted by the fact that all the wolves, free-loading or not, generally benefit from pack-hunting. But it does highlight that, by the rubric of "natural goodness" which Foot has proposed, cooperative behavior is only "good" to the extent that it helps the individual. When such behavior can be subverted to the individuals benefit this too is "good".

No doubt an individual bee that does not dance does not itself suffer from its delinquency, but ipso facto because it does not dance, there is something wrong with it, because of the part that dancing plays in the life of this species of bee. (p. 35)

I just don't see how that follows from the prior definition of terms. Dancing can be established as a "good" at the group level; all bees benefit from the group tendency to dance. However, that a single bee fails to dance doesn't harm the bee, and probably has negligible impact on the group. If the non-dancing behavior does not undermine the individual bee's well-being then it seems hard to say that there is something "wrong" with the bee in the moral sense; the bee is different from its peers, to be sure, but this difference appears to be morally neutral.

There seems to be a strong desire to conflate the good of the individual with the good of the group, even though the rubric of "goodness" is applied at the individual level. Foot doesn't seem to have been able to resolve the tension that I noted earlier, even at the level of non-human animals. I don't have a whole lot of confidence that she'll be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat for the human ones.

Similarly, cooperation is something on which good hangs in the life of a wolf, and the free-riding wolf is not behaving as it should. (p. 35)

This statement is easier to grapple with. "Cooperation" is not an all-or-nothing thing; if a wolf can cooperate most of the time and free-ride a little bit of the time, thereby furthering its individual well-being, then it is absolutely behaving as it should per Foot's original definition. It is also true that, if all the wolves were to free-ride then they'd all probably suffer, but that seems to be irrelevant to determining the well-being of an individual wolf in a particular, fact-bound situation.

This is not nitpicking; this is the heart of social morality for human beings. As I wrote elsewhere: "If I kill someone, steal his stuff, and then sell it to finance a college education and a gym membership" that seems to work to my benefit provided I don't get caught. Being able to rebut this proposition effectively seems to be high on the list of requirements for any "natural" system of ethics such as Foot proposes.

More generally what is "good" for the individual, by any metric, may not necessarily be "good" for the group, or vice versa. A moral theory needs to provide clear guidance as to how conflicts are to be arbitrated or it ceases to be of much value due to simple lack of utility.

Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not therby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good. The bearing and rearing of children is not an ultimate good in human life, because other elements of good such as the demands of work to be done may give a man or woman reason to renounce family life. And the great (if often troubling) good of having children has to do with the love and ambition of parents for children, the special role of grandparents, and many other things, and many other things that simply do not belong to animal life. (p. 42)

Defining "human good" is clearly going to be very important, but if I may hazard a guess the above quote foreshadows that the definition thereof is almost certainly going to become mired in hopeless subjectivity.

Thus the idea of a good life for a human being, and the question of its relation to happiness is each deeploy problematic. And, moreover, there is so much diversity in human beings and human cultures that the schema of natural normativity may seem to be inapplicable from the start. Nevertheless, for all the diversities of human life, it is possible to give some quite general account of human necessities, that is, of what is quite generally needed for huan good, if only by starting from the negative idea of human deprivation. (p. 43)

Ok, I'll buy that. I'd go so far as to call that particular tack "clever".

For then we see at once that human good depends on many characteristics and capacities that are not needed even by animals, never mind by plants. There arem for instance, physical properties such as the kind of larynx that allows of the myriad sounds that make up human language, as well as the kind of hearing that can distinguish them. (p. 43)

Eh... not compelling. I can turn that around and say that animals depend on many characteristics which are not needed by humans (enhanced senses, claws, venom, flight), nevermind plants. Or that plants depend on photosynthesis, which is needed by neither animals nor humans. At best this shows that humans have unique requirements, but so do many other animals.

Moreover, human beings need the mental capacity for learning language; they also need powers of imagintion that allow them to understand stories, to join in songs and dances -- and to laugh at jokes. Without such things human beings may survive and reproduce themselves, but they are deprived. (p. 43)

I don't dance and don't really care to do so; it would be laughable to categorize myself as "deprived" in either a absolute or relative sense as a result. I don't sing very much, and don't greatly value the ability to do so, but all else equal it would be nice to carry a tune so maybe I'm "mildly deprived" in that regard? More tellingly, however, my feelings on the subject would likely be much different if I found myself in a milieu where those talents were highly valued. As it stands I live in a slice of the world where singing and dancing just doesn't come up much.

Given the variety of human behavior it seems totally unjustified to say someone is "deprived" by virtue of not singing or dancing, or not having the capacity to do so. Certainly such arguments as can be made seem to be highly subjective, or at least culture bound, so it's hard to see in what sense they are "natural" except at a exceedingly broad level of generalization. But there's nothing particularly special about singing and dancing; the same arguments can be made about virtually any human endeavor. To call an individual "deprived" without considering the totality of their circumstances seems unjustified.

And what could be more natural than to say on this acccount that we have introduced the subject of possible human defects; calling them 'natural defects' as we used these terms in the discussion of plant and animal life? (p. 43)

Well, how about because you haven't demonstrated that they are "defects" by your earlier definition? Or that they apply to all humanity? You're just asserting that humans "need to X" or "need to have the capability to X", and have had the bad fortune to pick some examples which seem easily rebuttable. At this point in the argument I can say "need to have the capability to solve differential equations" with exactly as much justification as you say "need to have the capability to dance", so you're going to have to fill in the details a little bit first.

As some species of animals need a lookout, or as herds of elephants need an old she-elephant to lead them to a watering hole, so human societies need leaders, explorers, and artists. Failure to perform a special role can here be a defect in a man or woman who is not ready to contribute what he or she alone -- or best -- can give. There is also something wrong with us if we do not support those of genius, or even special talent, in their work.

Where to begin? Random thoughts in no particular order:

  • Foot has a very specific teleology in mind, one that is focused on the flourishing of society as a whole.
  • What is the "natural" boundary of a society? Assuming such a thing exists, and can be coherently spoken of to have "needs", to what level do we look? Local communities? Cities, states, countries? The globe? However you define "the good" of society you'll get different, probably irreconcilable answers at different levels. There doesn't seem to be any principled way to make this decision.
  • How does one incur an obligation to perform a particular job? How can this obligation be squared with the notion of "the good" of an individual?

I have to admit that seeing these sort of highly contentious statements tossed out as if they were self-evident makes me want to abandon the whole project right now. Natural Goodness is a slim volume; there's almost certainly not enough room for Foot to develop an adequate justification for that sort of thing.

It is worth remarking that in considering reasons for action in the earlier chapters we seemed to move quite naturally between the example of somoen kept in bed by flu and that of the explorer Maklay bound by his promise to his servant. Various observations were made about the relation between the concepts of goodness and reasons with no distinction of 'non-moral' and 'moral' examples. Was this a mistake? (p. 67)

What to say about this except to disagree with Foot's assessment that the flu example (p. 59) is 'non-moral'. Foot has not treated it as a moral dilemma along the same lines as the Maklay example (p. 47), but I think that just goes to show that Foot is importing normativity without even realizing it. For the individual in question to stay in bed rather than deposit a check is to prioritize that individual's well-being over the external obligations to other represented by checks which have been written but not funded. This is not even to argue that such a decision is improper, or that I wouldn't do the same thing myself in the situation, but merely to point out that prioritizing individual well-being over external obligations is a moral choice.

First, goodness can come from the nature of the action itself -- from what it is that is done. So, in general, an act of saving life is good in this respect, while an act of killing is bad. (p. 72)

Yes, but why is an act of killing bad? That's the hard bit, isn't it? This is especially interesting in light of Foot liking to use wolves as an example. An alpha wolf, when it grows old and slow, may be killed by a member of its pack. This is what wolves do; it is normative in the statistical sense. But it is also "good" using Foot's rubric, since a wolf which kills the alpha wolf gains power, a bigger share of the kill, access to females, and so. In fact, using Foot's rubric it's pretty easy to argue that a wolf which fails to kill the alpha wolf, when given then chance, is actually defective.

Here's the thing... its entirely possible that we, homo sapiens, exhibited similar behavior during our own pre-history. At what point during our emergence from the ooze did it go from being "good" to kill in this manner to being "not good"? What specific set of bits had to get flipped to switch the rule from "kill" to "do not kill"?

I almost feel like we're talking past each other at this point. Foot has been discussing J.S. Mill and Aquinas and voluntary/non-voluntary acts, and I keep waiting her to show how the nebulous notion of "human goodness" can be derived from natural considerations.

That we tend to speak in moral philosphy only of volitional faults that impinge particularly on others gives the whole subject an objectionably rigoristic, prissy, moralistic tone that we would hardly care to take up in everyday life. (Pp. 79 - 80)

I disagree vigorously, but I think this only serves to emphasize that Foot and I stand on opposing sides of a vast chasm. She believes in the existence of "virtues of the will", and of virtue in general, and reasons accordingly. I, on the other hand, can see no reason why I, or anyone else, should care a whit someone does in isolation. Morality, in my view, is solely concerned with the mediation of conflict that arises due to social interation. That's the opposite of prissy; it's the natural outcome of "And it harm none, do what thou wilt". It seems far more "moralistic" to me to render judgement on someone's private business.

For there is a way in which a good person must not only see his or her good as bound up with goodness of desire and action, but also feel that it is, with sentiments such as pleasure, pride, and honour. (p. 98)

Foot has been discussing of what "human good" could possibly consist and, after considering "happiness" in light of Wittgenstein (who, by her reckoning, lead a "good" but not "happy" life), seems to be identifying "the good" with a set of internal mental states. This is interesting in that it at least points to something "natural", something that we could, in theory, measure. But it also points in a direction that she would surely find disagreeable, seemingly implying that it's only wrong to kill someone if doing so induces (or fails to induce) a certain set of internal mental states.

[Nietzsche] represents human good in terms of individuality, spontenaity, daring, and a kind of creativity that rejects the idea of a rule of life that would be valid for others as well. Members of 'the herd' are, by contrast, conforming, fawning, propitiating, 'dog-like' creatures. They settle for a banal kind of happiness; they 'have little pleasures for the day and little pleasure for the night; and they take good care of their health'. (p. 106)

This is interesting in that Nietzsche seems to regard 'the herd' in the same way that Foot regards the lobotomized patient content to rake leaves all day (Pp. 85 - 86). In fact, Foot goes on to say something in this regard that could just as easily be Nietzsche's commentary on his human sheep:

But the example shows that when we talk about a happiness that is supposed to be humanity's good we cannot intend pleasure or contentment alone. As Aristotle remarked, we should not wish to continue in the pleasures of childhood at the cost of remaining a child. (p. 86)

The main difference, as far as I can tell, is merely where they're prepared to draw the line.

Is charity really mostly a sham? sometime, of course, it may be a sham, and Nietzsche, with his devilish eye for hidden malice and self-aggreandizement and for acts of kindness motivated by the wish to still self-doubt, arouses a wry sense of familiarity in most of us. But this is not to say that there is not a great deal of genuine charity -- of genuine verture -- in people who do not at all fit the picture Nietzsche draws of those master types who hold themselves at a distint from the Christian 'herd'. (p. 107)

So how are we to identify 'genuine' charity? Through introspection perhaps? But if Foot believes in 'depth psychology' she must also be aware of the various issues surrounding the accessibility of internal mental states to the introspector.Final motivations may not be accessible through introspection, the exact reasons for which depend on who you ask. I raise this issue merely to show the difficulties in separating the wheat from the chaff in this case.

Thinking of the ordinary unpretentious men and women who seem to find special happiness in working for the relief of suffering, one must surely find Nietzsche's dismissive views on compassion rather silly.

Ummm... no. You're going to have to do better than "silly".

In The Geneology of Morals, published in 1887, [Nietzsche] wrote:

To talk of intrinsic right and wrong is absolutely nonsensical: intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation, an annihilation can be nothing wrong, in as much as life is essentially... something which functions by injuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilating, and is absolutely incomprehensible without such a character.

The reason given here as to why no action ca be intrinsically wrong is not one that we can take very seriously, because it depends on an illicit identification of features of the plan and animal worlds with humans acts of injury or oppression.

Then why the fuck have you been nattering on about "natural goodness"? You're the one making the big deal about how we can examine human behavior in exactly the same way we evaluate the "goodness" of the roots of an oak or the "goodness" of pack-hunting behavior in the wolf. Why is Nietzsche's identification illicit when it seems to be pretty much in line with the whole premise of the book?

There was, I am arguing, no sound basis in psychology for the Nietzschean denial that descriptions of what was done, such as 'injury', 'oppression', or 'annihilation', mark out examples of acts contrary to the virtue of justice -- unjust actions -- that in themselves are morally wrong. This denial seems to me to be a totally mistaken and moreover poisonous doctrine. It is of course contrary to the principles of natural normativity as expounded in the present book, because there is nothing human beings need more than protection from those who would harm and oppress them.

Eh... that's halfway true. Widespread rapine is in no one's interest, so to the extent that a widely adopted Nietzschean ethic would prove socially destabilizing it does go against "natural normativity" as defined. But Foot has yet to respond to Adeimantus' challenge, that "the best policy will be to be unjust and not be found out" (Pp. 100 - 101).

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