Sunday, September 30, 2018

Generally Disappointed in "The Lies That Bind"

I finished reading Kwame Anthony Appiah's The Lies That Bind and was totally underwhelmed; the book feels like a missed opportunity. He spends 6 chapters demonstrating, quiet eloquently in places, that Sturgeon was right, only to finish up with the world's most milquetoast coda.

If it turns out, as Appiah has so ably demonstrated, that our conceptions of religion ("creed") or race ("color") are badly mistaken, then surely that has some implications for current discourse? I mean, he writes "The modes of identity we'e considered can all become for of confinement, conceptual mistakes underwriting moral ones." (p. 218), which would be a great segue to the second half of the book where he talks about common moral mistakes in the present. And yet the book ends at p. 219 with a bland call for us to recognize our shared humanity.

What gives? I mean, its a glaring and obvious omission which cries out for explanation. As far as I can tell Appiah has a lot of credibility with the public at large, which puts him in a good position to say something that people will actually listen to. His decision not to venture into an explication of moral mistakes stems from what?

I can't really even hazard a guess... maybe he just didn't want to? In any case, The Lies That Bind ends up feeling like a joke without a punchline.

Thursday, September 27, 2018

Since it Seems to be De Rigueur Today

I dunno... a pox on both their houses?

Judicial confirmations are a political process; I'll concede that without issue. But for the love of Dog Almighty is it too much to ask for something which at least approximates a truth-tracking process?

And lordy, we thought that confirmations were viscious before... I expect what comes after this will be a blood sport.

Monday, September 24, 2018

Wherein Ophelia Benson Demonstrates My Point and Agrees With My Conclusion

Quoth Opehlia:

The calendar pages from June, July and August 1982, which were examined by The New York Times, show that Judge Kavanaugh was out of town much of the summer at the beach or away with his parents. When he was at home, the calendars list his basketball games, movie outings, football workouts and college interviews. A few parties are mentioned but include names of friends other than those identified by Dr. Blasey.
*gasp* What a bombshell! I’m sure he recorded every single name of every single person who was at every single gathering he attended that summer. I’m sure there’s no chance that he could have recorded some people but not all.
Setting aside the wholly-justified question "Who the fuck has calendars from 1982 lying around?", this is exactly what I'm getting on about. The calendar, assuming its legit, is consistent with both scenarios: he did commit sexual assault, and he didn't. What evidence could he produce at this point which would demonstrate, to Ophelia's satisfaction, that he's not guilty?

I would hope that she'd give that question serious consideration, given that she quotes this tweet approvingly:

Juror: The testimony I hear at trial won’t change my vote.
Judge: You may be excused.

Graham: Ford’s testimony won’t change my vote https://t.co/eddpEFdsSP via @politico

— Richard W. Painter (@RWPUSA) September 23, 2018

If it's true that Graham should be willing to be convinced by Ford's testimony then it's equally true that Ophelia should be willing to be swayed by Kavanaugh's.

Friday, September 21, 2018

There Are Good Reasons to be Cautious About Any Kavanaugh Inquiry

There are good reasons that we should be cautious about endorsing any Kavanaugh inquiry, formal or informal, reason which are a direct result of taking the charges levelled against him seriously.

I take "believe the victim" to mean that we should start from a presumption of guilt. However, in order to meet basic standards of fairness/due process such a presumption has to be defeasible i.e. there exists the possibility to effectively rebut the charge. In my previous post I characterized this as there being one or more pieces of evidence which are practically accessible, the production of which would serve to meet whatever burden of proof is needed. This is true regardles of whether we're talking about formal legal proceedings or extra-legal, fact-finding processes.

In the case at hand we could ask "Is there anything Kavanaugh could say, any evidence that he could produce, which would convince people that he didn't commit sexual assault?". I'm having a hard time coming up with anything that would meet this burden under a "preponderance of evidence" standard, much less a more-stringent standard. Charges of sexual assault are notoriously hard to (dis)prove even when the event takes place in the present; that the charges against Kavanaugh involve an event which is 36 years removed makes the prospect significantly more difficult. Due to the passage of time there's unlikely to be any corroborating/exculpatory evidence of a physical nature, so we're going to be left with the verbal testimony of people trying to remember the details of something that happened 36 years ago. I'm simply at a loss to identify anything that Kavanaugh, or people speaking in his defense, could say that would make it more probable than not that he didn't commit sexual assault.

And that's where the problem arises; the accusation of sexual assault against Kavanaugh appears to be unanswerable. The outcome is predetermined, and predetermined outcomes are generally taken to be a failure of due process. Put more succinctly: If there's nothing that Kavanaugh could say to establish his innocence then the inquiry process is pointless at best and a sham at worst.

Let's stop for a moment and look at the features of the argument above. It is not an argument

  • That "boys will be boys".
  • To let "bygones be bygones".
  • That the evidence which exists points to either Kavanaugh's guilt or innocence.
Rather, the argument is based purely upon structural features associated with the presumption of guilt; it turns on no specifics about Kavanaugh's sitution (apart from the passage of time) and could apply equally well to many, many other situations.

What we have here is a conflict between analysis at the aggregate level and analysis at the individual level. We presume guilt because, taken in aggregate, reports of sexual assault are usually true. However, when trying to assess any particular individual's culpability, we're analyzing things at an individual level. Regardless of what the stats say at an aggregate level, individuals must have the ability to rebut the charges against them.

And this is why people of all political leanings should proceed with caution; given the considerations above it looks like the charge leveled against Kavanaugh is indefeasible. By all accounts the man is a rat bastard, but he's still entitled to basic considerations of fairness/due process. And yes, it's true that sexual assault victims are also treated unfairly in an unfortunately large number of ways, but I simply reject the idea that introducing yet more unfairness is an appropriate response.

Thursday, September 20, 2018

Make That 1.5 Qualms

Apropos the previous post, I had another thought regarding defeasibility. Switching from a presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt introduces another complication due to the assymmetry of proving something did happen and proving that it didn't.

In general its easier to demonstrate that something happened then something didn't happen. An event that occurs will often leave some sort of discernable traces in its wake, positive evidence which can rebut the presumption of innocence and thus satisfy the requirement that such a presumption be defeasible. Put more clearly, when we ask "What sort of evidence would we accept to prove that event X happened?" its pretty easy to come up with a long list for a wide variety of common Xs.

Now consider the opposite case of trying to prove an event didn't happen. A thing which does not happen will, by definition, fail to leave traces, so rebuttal must happen indirectly by considering the state of the world and seeing if its logically consistent with what we'd expect to see if some event X didn't occur:
  • The dog always barks at strangers in the backyard.
  • We didn't hear the dog bark.
  • Therefore the state of the world is consistent with the hypothesis that a stranger did not enter the yard.
Which is not to say that no direct evidence will ever exist ("Your honor, here's a videotape of the yard during the time in question, which demonstrates conclusively that no one crossed the yard"), but rather that such evidence will be less common and the challenge of proving an events' non-occurence more difficult.
But there's another hitch as well: Sometimes an event is know to happen but leave discernable traces. In this case the state of the world will be consistent with the hypothesis that the event happened and the hypothesis that it did not:
  • The dog usually barks when a stranger enteres the yard.
  • We didn't hear the dog bark.
  • Therefore it's likely, but not 100% certain, that a stranger didn't enter the yard.
In this circumstance its possible to build a probabilistic case that the event didn't occur, but doing so be more difficult than the opposite.
All of the above points to the challenges inherent in proving that something didn't happen compared to providing that something did. Such considerations inevitably become fact bound, so its diffcult to generalize beyond the following: When evaluating a claim its important to ask what evidence could be produced to prove, at whatever level of confidence is desried, the truth of that claim. If that list is empty then the criteria of theoretical falsifiability is violated. If that list is non-empty, but such evidence as it contains is unavailable for practical reasons, then the criteria of practical falsifiability in violated. In either case there's a failure of due process; it is not fair to bring a charge if there is no evidence which could reasonably be produced to disprove it.

Wednesday, September 19, 2018

Permit Me One Qualm?

We can choose to switch from a presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt if the priors merit it. However, regardless of which we choose, the presumption must be defeasible, at least in principle, yes? A charge which cannot, even in theory, be rebutted fails to conform to any reasonable definition of "due process".

What about a charge which may be contestable in theory, but is de factor uncontestable? I suppose it depends on your stance vis a vis substantive due process. If you're a pure, 100% formalist, you might very well say that the bar for due process has been met. But if you care about substantive issues you very well may object that a charge which, practically speaking, cannot be refuted fails that test as well.

Now, speaking more plainly to the matter at hand: How do we proceed if enough time has passed as to render relevant evidence inaccesible? Considerations of substantive due process might lead one to conclude that the condition of defeasibility has been violated, since one cannot, in practice, farily assess a charge without access to the relevant evidence.

Saturday, September 15, 2018

Manichaeism? Moral Bookkeeping? Failure to Appreciate Distinctions?

As I was reading Noah Berlatsky's review of The Coddling of the American Mind I found myself asking "What does that have to do with anything?" to many of his criticisms. It's not that his arguments against the book were bad, but rather that they appeared to be mostly non-responsive, in some cases obviously so. Which seems like an interesting enough phenomenon that it merits discussion.

Berlatsky discusses four people in particular: Charles Murray, Erika Christiakis, Laura Kipnis, and Robert Zimmer. However, even fully accepting his characterization of people and events, there's not a whole lot of there there:

Murry: Berlatsky is on firmest ground in this instance, saying that Haidt and Lukianoff are "soft-pedaling" Murry's history of racist writing. He writes
But is protest itself wrong in this case?
That's not what Haidt/Lukianoff are getting at at all; there's no reason to assume that they've any complaint with the students protesting Charles Murray. Rather, the Murray section of the book is primarily a discussion of the "heckler's veto" e.g. sustained disruption which prevents someone from speaking at all. They think that it's happening more often, and is increasingly tolerated by administrators. But Berlatsky doesn't address this; the closest he comes is saying
In the melee as student protesters demonstrated against Murray, one student pulled the hair of the professor who was supposed to interview Murray, giving the professor a concussion. Whether that incident is an example of student excessive fearfulness is perhaps an open question. But it's certainly ugly.
Ok, great, we're in agreement: it's ugly. But whence springs the ugliness, if not excessive fearfulness? And is that sort of disruption to be tolerated? Berlatsky doesn't say.
I said above that he's on "firmest ground" with this example. An argument has been made, by multiple parties at this late date, that some speakers are so damaging that they should not be allowed to speak at all. I'd expect Berlatsky to embrace this argument and then show that Murray falls within it's scope. But he doesn't do that, just leaves the reader with the following thought
How can the authors assess whether protest is justified if they don't accurately explain what's at stake?
Which, really, just misses the point entirely, doesn't it?

Christiakis: You think the discussion of Murry was bad? Here's the entirety of what Berlatsky has to say regarding Erika Christiakis:
Similarly, Lukianoff and Haidt applaud Christakis' argument that students shouldn't be asked to be racially sensitive when choosing Halloween costumes. They do not quote from a thoughtful and generous letter from 2015 by Yale student Ryan Wilson taking the contrary position.
Let's, for the sake of argument, grant that Erika Christiakis was totally off-base in sending that email. Taking that as given, how is it the least bit reasonable that students ended up screaming at her husband? That's the focus of that particular section of Coddling, responses by students (and administrators) which seem disproportionate to the inciting incident. Berlatsky doesn't just gloss over that issue; he doesn't mention it at all.

Kipnis: Berlatsky spends several paragraphs on Kipnis; go read them for full flavor. Here's what I took to be the crux of his criticism:
But in making her out to be the wronged party, they similarly dismiss concerns among students about professors' sometimes-predatory behavior.
It would help if he quoted them actually being dismissive, because that's not what I took away from the authors' discussion of Kipnis.
Rather, their focus was on the fact that a professor was subjected to two Title IX investigations for writing about why she disagreed with Title IX. The first stemmed from an article which met the publication standards of the frickin' Chronicle of Higher Education, while the second arose when she published a book that recounted her first investigation. One can simultaneously be concerned about predatory behavior by professors and the chilling effects of over-broad interpretations of Title IX; there's nothing logically inconsistent about that.
In this case you can (sort of) follow Berlatsky's reasoning by reading between the lines:
Kipnis was eventually cleared of wrongdoing, and her investigation has made her a free-speech cause for many on the right and center-right.
I think the subtext of the above is that, in labeling "free-speech" as a "right and center-right" concern, he's dismissing it as a legitimate grievance, which would explain why he doesn't engage with the authors' argument. Though this is significantly undermined by the fact that Berlatksy identifies Haidt and Lukianoff as being on the "center left" elsewhere in the article, and both authors are clearly quite concerned about free speech issues as they relate to Kipnis.

Zimmer: Lastly, there's the discussion about Zimmer, which is what prompted me to write this article. He gets way more column inches than seems merited, given that I think he's only quote in passing in Coddling. There's a long digression on students and staff trying to get a trauma center at the University of Chicago and Zimmer's response in one instance:
At one point, nine protesters, including one student, occupied the University of Chicago hospital demanding to speak with Zimmer. Instead of engaging in a free-spirited, open debate, Zimmer ducked the meeting, and the protesters were arrested.
Berlatsky takes this as evidence that Zimmer is not in favor of "open discourse and free debate". Declining to engage with protesters who are occupying a building is not at all equivalent to curtailing someone else's speech.

Anyway, all of the above is preamble to the actual question: What's going on here? While you might quibble with Berlatsky's representation of any single figure, taken as a whole it seems obvious, to me at least, that the article is a collection of missed points and non-sequiters. Condensing Berlatsky's main points significantly (again, go read the whole article):
  • Charles Murray is an unredeemed racist. The authors need to make this clear so that readers will understand that protesting him was totally appropriate.
  • Erika Christiakis was wrong; here's a student's counter-argument.
  • Kipnis' behavior undermined Title IX protections. Students who bring Title IX prosecutions are "brave".
  • Zimmer isn't a free-speech supporter. Instead, "he was a reactionary foot-dragger, refusing to hold discussions or acknowledge community needs until direct action and a rolling public relations disaster forced his hand".
I think maybe the answer can be found in the conclusion to Berlatsky's article:
Haidt and Lukianoff, though, consistently see the less powerful as a real danger, while framing protest against powerful institutions as childish caterwauling. The result is that they end up telling students that the only way they can truly be brave and adventurous is by obeying authority and doing what they're told.
Which, ironically, is a highly dualistic view of a book that spends a lot of time trying to break down various dualisms.
A dualistic world view, as a theory for this behavior, has a lot of explanatory power. Spitballing here:
  • The people that the authors discuss (Murry, Christiakis, and Kipnis, at least) are morally flawed figures, therefore bad things that happened to them are either merited or can be disregarded.
  • Either the students are righteous or they're "childish".
  • The alternative to unfettered protest is to obey authority and do what you're told.
I mean, really, that's about how Berlatsky sums it up; this is all about the powerless protesting the powerful. Reading his conclusion you'd think that Haidt and Lukianoff told the students to sit down and shut up. Hell, the authors aren't really even interested in protest, per se, but rather in understanding the factors that lead to things like https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IEFD_JVYd0 and maybe suggesting that it would be better if people don't do that. Which is a pretty far cry from the  picture which Berlatsky paints.

Tuesday, September 11, 2018

A Proof For Humanism(?)

This randomly occurred to me the other day, not sure of its import. Starting with an easy one:
P1
  1. Anyone who identifies as a woman is a woman.
  2. Not everyone who identifies as a woman feels safe doing so publicly.
  3. From 1 and 2: Someone who publicly identifies as a woman could truly identify as a man.
I also think the following is uncontentious:
P2
  1. Anyone who identifies as a man is a man.
  2. Not everyone who identifies as a man feels safe doing so publicly.
  3. From 1 and 2: Someone who publicly identifies as a man could truly identify as a woman.
This generalization might be a little shaky, but let's run with it anyway:
P3
  1. Anyone who identifies as <Gender X> is <Gender X>.
  2. Not everyone who identifies as <Gender X> feels safe doing so publicly.
  3. From 1 and 2: Someone who publicly identifies as <Gender X> could truly identify as any gender.
From P1 and P2: 
  • Someone who self-identifies as a woman could be a man or a woman.
    • AND
  • Someone who self-identifies as a man could be a man or a woman.
    • THEREFORE
  • You can't tell whether someone is a man or a woman, regardless of how they self-identify.
If you accept P3 as a valid generalization, this becomes
  • You can't tell what gender someone is, regardless of how they self-identify.

Assuming you buy the line of reasoning above, you're left with something of a dilemma: How do you treat people if you can never truly know their gender? The solution which occurs to me is that you treat each person in a gender-blind fashion, as a person with their own intrinsic dignity. Which sounds a lot like the "humanism" side of the old "feminism vs. humanism" debate.

On The Fracturing of Language And The Disutility Of Labels

One of the unavoidable by-products of the democratization of language is that many frequently-used terms have picked up multiple meanings which aren't identifiable by context. Apropos the previous post, "racism" can be:
  • "a belief or doctrine that inherent differences among the various human racial groups determine cultural or individual achievement, usually involving the idea that one's own race is superior and has the right to dominate others or that a particular racial group is inferior to the others." (1).
  • "Racial prejudice + Enhanced power of one race relative to another."
  • "[a] system of oppression based on race" (2).
That's a non-exhaustive list, BTW.
I'm not going to argue for one or the other, but rather point out a couple of things:
  • There are important, fundamental differences between each of these definitions. The same is true for other terms ("sexist" or "transphobic" or ...).
  • When someone says "X is Y", it's frequently difficult, or simple impossible, to understand which definition they are using.
  • Without the ability to ask clarifying questions you really can't tell what they're asserting. Contra Marcus, asking "What do you mean by 'X'?" is, in many cases, a necessary precursor to engaging an argument in good faith.
This is why I try to avoid (imperfectly, I'll be the first to admit) arguing about the meaning of labels, or using contested labels. All that gets you is interminable arguments about who's really a feminist/racist/man/woman/etc. I find it much more fruitful to ask what ideas people are trying to convey by the use of the label.

"Oppression = Prejudice + Power": Random Thoughts Inspired by Crip Dyke

See https://freethoughtblogs.com/pervertjustice/2018/09/10/we-dont-know-what-sexism-is/. Taking, for example
Racism = Racial Prejudice + Enhanced Power of one race relative to another
  • What's the context for calculations of "Enhanced power"? Locally, nationally, globally?
  • Getting into discussions about "what racism really is" obscures the issue.
  • Surely acting on racial prejudice is definitionally bad, yes?
    • Prejudice leads to discrimination, or so the Google tells me.
    • Discrimination is bad because
      • It undermines equality of opportunity (1).
      • It's unfair and leads to negative externalities (2).
      • Other permutations in this same vein.
  • "Ah-hah", says the interlocutor, "in order to do any of those things you must have power!"
    • "Yes!" says I, but the relevant power differential to consider is that which exists between the parties in the transaction.
    • Clearly the races of the participants play a part, but aren't anywhere near the whole story.
    • When my jerk-ass First Nations boss gives me shitty shifts because he hates black people I've still been wronged, even if indigenous peoples have relatively less power when considered in any scope.
  • Given the above, it's far from clear that the formulation "Racism = Racial Prejudice + Enhanced Power of one race relative to another" actually gets us anywhere.
    • Aforementioned jerk-ass boss isn't engaging in "racism" by this definition.
    • Presumably this type of behavior is important enough that it deserves its own term; what word do you use for "someone who acts out of racial prejudice"?
  • Also, I'm personally appalled by the formulation, since it sees participants in the exchange only in terms of their group membership; it fundamentally denies their individual personhood.
  • I think you can raise similar objections to any variant of "Oppression = Prejudice + Power".

Tap tap...

Is this thing on?

Great, still works.

No time for prolonged posts these days, but I've things rattling around in my head. Getting them down on paper should stop the rattling.
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