A Critique Of Certainty And Social Justice

Real quick-like, because I have to places to be in 10 minutes...

Kristen J over at Feministe kindly requests critiques of her stance vis-a-vis certainty and social justice. Conveniently, not too long ago I wrote a post on the implications of atheism and skepticism for social justice (among other things). Since I now have to jet in 6 minutes I'll briefly summarize the argument:

Skepticism of the type expressed by Kristen, since it rejects the notion that there's some objective, normative reality "out there" to which we can all refer, is incompatible with teleologic theories of social justice . Kristen may believe one thing and I may believe another, but both of our views are equally legitimate from an epistemic standpoint. So how do we decide who's views are to have force of law? The only avenue which seems at all fruitful is to reject substantive notions of justice in favor of purely procedural ones. However, based on the tone of her post, I suspect that Kristen would find pure procedural theories to be thing gruel indeed.