Empty Classes Have No Morally Salient Properties

On reflection I realize that my previous post omitted an important critique: empty classes have no morally salient properties.

For example, arguments that trans individuals should be treated according to their self-identified gender usually hinge (sometimes implicitly) on the notion that do otherwise would be harmful to their mental well-being. However, the class of trans persons as defined by Allison (see my previous post) has no characteristics that would lead us to conlude that this would be the case.

An obvious rejoiner to the above observation is "They say they're X, so they should be treated like X". But we don't typically accept that sort of reasoning in other situations; there's a tremendous amount of boundary policing that goes on for many common group membership claims. What is it about identity claims asserted by trans individuals that makes them unique? Again, if we use Allison's definition we're left scratching our heads; trans individuals have no characteristics that would support this treatment.

The above observation is, I think, a pretty dig deal, much more so than other problems that I outlined previously. Refusal to put any sort of bounds on what it means to be "trans" actively undermines claims for equal treatment (or special accomodations) made by trans activists.